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ABSTRACT 
Joint Vision 2020 presents a plan for military dominance over the 
spectrum of military operations.  One program that allows this to happen is 
Performance Logistics, which intends to increase availability and lower life cycle 
costs for weapon platforms.  The ability to sense impending failures plays an 
important role in Performance Logistics.  This thesis studies how sensor 
performance, as a tool of Condition Based Maintenance, affects the availability 
and cost of a generic component.  Different types of maintenance policies are 
evaluated and compared using mathematical models.  The maintenance 
protocols considered are reactive and proactive, namely: run to failure, 
scheduled inspection times, sensor based, and a combined inspection and 
sensor policy.  Given parameters such as time and repair cost due to warnings or 
failures and frequency of inspection, it’s found that a sensor influences the 
benefits of implementing a Condition Based Maintenance policy.  In this thesis, 
results show improvement in availability and a reduced long-run average 
operating cost when the median of the random ratio of warning to failure time is 
roughly 0.8, the standard deviation is less than 0.1, and the mean time of 
maintenance for failure is greater than three times the mean time of repair due to 
warning. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The computer code for this thesis has not been evaluated for all cases.  
Although every effort has been made, in the time allotted, to make sure the code 
is free from errors and logically correct it cannot be considered to have been 
thoroughly validated. 
 vii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION:  MAINTENANCE EFFICIENCY THROUGH FOCUSED 
LOGISTICS ..................................................................................................... 1 
A. BACKGROUND  .................................................................................. 1 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY ......................................................................... 2 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ............................................................... 2 
II. MAINTENANCE COSTS ARE A LARGE PORTION OF DOD 
OPERATION AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS  .............................................. 3 
A. O&S COSTS ARE A LARGE PORTION OF TOTAL LIFE CYCLE 
COSTS (LCC) ...................................................................................... 3 
B. MANY WAYS TO IMPLEMENT A MAINTENANCE POLICY .............. 3 
C. TRADITIONAL MAINTENANCE POLICIES ARE NOT ALWAYS 
EFFICIENT ........................................................................................... 4 
D. TECHNOLOGY CAN ENABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN 
MAINTENANCE EFFICIENCY ............................................................. 5 
E. CBM+ LEVERAGES TECHNOLOGY TO MAKE MAINTENANCE 
MORE EFFICIENT ............................................................................... 5 
F. METRICS HELP DEFINE AND EVALUATE APPROPRIATE 
APPLICATION OF A CBM+ POLICY .................................................. 7 
III. SYSTEM FAILURES AND WARNINGS CAN BE MODELED 
MATHEMATICALLY ....................................................................................... 9 
A. TIMES TO FAILURES MODELED AS RANDOM VARIABLES .......... 9 
1. The Exponential Distribution .................................................. 9 
B. WARNINGS MODELED AS PREDICTIVE OF FAILURES ................. 9 
1. Sensors Warn of Impending Failure ...................................... 9 
C. TIME AND COSTS FOR COMPONENT FAILURES, WARNINGS 
AND, REPLACEMENT OR REPAIR .................................................. 11 
IV. MODEL CHOICES FOR MAINTENANCE  ................................................... 13 
A. CYCLE TIMES ................................................................................... 13 
B. MAINTENANCE MODELS DESCRIBED MATHEMATICALLY 
WHEN FAILURES ARE OBSERVABLE ........................................... 13 
1. Run to Failure Model (RTF) ................................................... 13 
2. Sensor Based Predictive Model (Sensors) .......................... 14 
C. MAINTENANCE MODELS FOR A COMPONENT WITH NON-
OBSERVABLE FAILURES ................................................................ 15 
1. Scheduled Maintenance Model (Inspections) ..................... 15 
2. Inspection and Sensor Predictive Model (Inspections & 
Sensors) ................................................................................. 18 
D. COMMON FACTORS FOR TRADITIONAL AND CBM+ 
MAINTENANCE PROCESSES .......................................................... 20 
 ix 
V. ANALYSIS OF MODEL RESULTS:  CBM+ CAN BE BENEFICIAL 
WHEN APPLIED APPROPRIATELY  .......................................................... 23 
A. CBM+ SHOWS IMPROVEMENT OVER TRADITIONAL 
REACTIVE AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE BASED ON 
AVAILABILITY MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE (MOP) ................. 23 
B. COMPARISON OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS ................................... 29 
C. CBM+ MAINTENANCE METHODS DECREASE COSTS ................. 30 
D. SENSOR PARAMETER CHARACTERISTICS AND PREVENTING 
COMPONENT FAILURE DURING A MISSION ................................. 33 
VI. CONCLUSIONS:  HOW MUCH BETTER CAN CBM+ BE THAN 
TRADITIONAL MAINTENANCE? ................................................................ 37 
A. CBM+ AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE POLICIES .................... 37 
B. FUTURE ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 41 
1.  Model Refinement and Sensor Cost .......................................... 41 
2.  Apply to specific systems .......................................................... 41 
APPENDIX A: ANALYTIC DATA OUTPUT .................................................... 43 
APPENDIX B SELECTED WEIBULL PLOTS ............................................... 53 
APPENDIX C: SENSOR BASED PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE MODEL .... 59 
APPENDIX D: SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE MODEL ................................. 61 
APPENDIX E: SENSOR & INSPECTION BASED PREDICTIVE 
MAINTENANCE MODEL .............................................................................. 65 
APPENDIX F: IMPACT OF SENSOR EFFECTIVENESS ON MISSION 
TIMES AND AVAILABILITY ......................................................................... 67 
APPENDIX G: ADDITIONAL COMPARISON OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS.. 69 
APPENDIX H: VBA CODE .............................................................................. 71 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 77 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 79 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Maintenance Approaches (From: U.S. Department of Defense 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material 
Readiness, 2008) ............................................................................... xiv 
Figure 2. Maintenance Approaches (From: U.S. Department of Defense 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material 
Readiness, 2008) ................................................................................. 4 
Figure 3. Graphical Depiction of Run to Failure Model ...................................... 14 
Figure 4. Graphical Depiction of Sensor Based Maintenance Model ................. 15 
Figure 5. Graphical Depiction of Scheduled Maintenance Model ...................... 16 
Figure 6. Plot of Availability for Given Inter-Inspection Intervals ........................ 18 
Figure 7. Graphical Depiction of Inspection and Sensor Model ......................... 19 
Figure 8. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 0.25 ....................... 53 
Figure 9. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 0.5 ......................... 54 
Figure 10. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 1.0 ......................... 54 
Figure 11. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 2.0 ......................... 55 
Figure 12. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 5.0 ......................... 55 
Figure 13. Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 10 .......................... 56 
Figure 14. Plot of Availability for Given Inspection Intervals; with circles 
surrounding the approximate maximizing inter-inspection interval. .... 64 
 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Time and Cost Parameters ................................................................. 11 
Table 2. Optimal Inter-Inspection Intervals and Approximations for Given Ir  ... 17 
Table 3. Common Cost and Time Parameters for Calculations........................ 21 
Table 4. Availability for Case 5 when Shape Parameter is 10 .......................... 24 
Table 5. Availability for Case 21 when Shape Parameter is 10 ........................ 26 
Table 6. Availability for Case 5 when Shape Parameter is 0.25 ....................... 27 
Table 7. Availability for Case 21 when Shape Parameter is 0.25 ..................... 28 
Table 8. Operational Availability ....................................................................... 30 
Table 9. Long Run Average Costs for Case 3 when Shape Parameter is 10 ... 31 
Table 10. Long Run Average Costs for Case 3 when Shape Parameter is 
0.25 .................................................................................................... 32 
Table 11. Sensor Effect on Mission Times of Length Two ................................. 34 
Table 12. Comparison of Sensor and RTF Maintenance Policies on 
Availability. ......................................................................................... 38 
Table 13. Comparison of Inspection and Inspection and Sensor Maintenance 
Policies on Availability. ....................................................................... 40 
Table 14. Data Output for Cases 1-6 part 1 ....................................................... 43 
Table 15. Data Output for Cases 1-6 part 2 ....................................................... 44 
Table 16. Data Output for Cases 7-12 part 1 ..................................................... 44 
Table 17. Data Output for Cases 7-12 part 2 ..................................................... 45 
Table 18. Data Output for Cases 13-18 part 1.................................................... 45 
Table 19. Data Output for Cases 13-18 part 2.................................................... 46 
Table 20. Data Output for Cases 19-24 part 1.................................................... 46 
Table 21. Data Output for Cases 19-24 part 2.................................................... 47 
Table 22. Comparison of Sensor and Run to Failure Maintenance Policies on 
Availability .......................................................................................... 48 
Table 23. Comparison of Inspection and Sensor & Inspection Maintenance 
Policies on Availability ........................................................................ 49 
Table 24. Comparison of Sensor and Run to Failure Maintenance Policies on 
Long Run Average Cost ..................................................................... 50 
Table 25. Comparison of Inspection and Sensor & Inspection Maintenance 
Policies on Long Run Average Cost ................................................... 51 
Table 26. Covariance and Correlation of ,F WT T  ................................................. 57 
Table 27. Sensor Parameter Characteristics ...................................................... 58 
Table 28. Optimal and Approximately Optimal Inspection Intervals for Given 
Ir  ........................................................................................................ 64 
Table 29. Additional Comparison of Analytical Results ...................................... 70 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Joint Vision 2020 presents the plan for military dominance over the 
spectrum of military operations.  One program that will allow this to happen is 
Performance Logistics.  A component of this is Condition Based Maintenance 
Plus (CBM+): 
The CBM+ initiative covers a variety of technological and business 
changes designed to create a new maintenance environment in 
DOD. Projected changes focus on the vehicle platform with 
automated embedded sensor-based technologies providing 
standardized data in an integrated data environment.  These 
initiatives include enhanced prognostics and diagnostic techniques, 
failure and trend analysis, electronic portable or point of 
maintenance aids, serial item management, Automated 
Identification Technology, and data-driven interactive training. (U.S. 
Department of Defense Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, 2004)   
The maintenance of weapon systems is expensive.  In FY2007, the cost of 
DoD maintenance was more than $84 billion (2008 DoD Maintenance Factbook).  
Over the life of a weapon system, operations and support costs comprise roughly 
65-80% of the total life cycle costs (Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+); 
Department of Defense (DoD) Guidebook May 2008).  Maintenance costs are 
typically a large percentage of those operational and support costs, potentially 
$67 billion in FY2007. 
Currently, maintenance approaches are varied.  Figure 1 displays 
properties of reactive and proactive maintenance approaches.  Proactive 
categories consist of preventive and predictive.  Predictive maintenance is 
divided into diagnostic and prognostic.  Sensors may be used for predictive 
maintenance.  The sensors are to warn of impending failures.  For generality and 
analytic convenience, these predictive maintenance policies are studied using a 
failure time having an exponential distribution and a positively correlated warning 
time of impending failure.  The ratio of warning time to failure time is a random 
variable independent of the failure time usually having a Weibull distribution.  If 
 xiv 
the ratio is greater than 1, then the warning does not occur and there is a failure 
without warning.  The Weibull distribution is specified by its shape parameter and 
median.  Upon replacement, repair or inspection during which the component is 
found failed the component is returned to a “as good as new” state.  Renewal 
reward process theory is used to determine the operational availability and long-
run average cost of a component for the different maintenance policies. 
 
Figure 1.   Maintenance Approaches (From: U.S. Department of Defense Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, 2008) 
The maintenance methods considered in the study are both reactive and 
proactive, namely; run to failure, scheduled inspection times, sensor based and, 
a combined inspection and sensor policy.  The combined inspection and sensor 
policy can be thought of as a transitional policy where sensors for a sensor 
based policy are used in addition to the inspection of a component.  Given 
parameters such as mean time and mean cost of inspections as well as repairs 




implementing a predictive Condition Based Maintenance policy with a sensor can 
significantly improve the operational availability as well as reduce long-run 
average costs. 
Two cases are considered.  In the first case, failures are observable (the 
policies are run to failure with no sensor and condition based with sensor).  In the 
second case, failures are not observable except by inspection or warning and the 
policies are inspection only or inspection in addition to possible sensor warning 
(scheduled inspection time and combined inspection and warning).  The ability of 
the sensor to increase the operational availability of the component depends on 
the ratio of the mean repair time due to failure and that due to a warning; if the 
ratio is close to one, the sensor adds little value.  It is also influenced by the 
variability of the ratio of sensor warning time to the time of failure; large variability 
can result in premature warning or no warning at all.  Finally, it is influenced by 
the median of the ratio of the warning time to the failure; if the median of the ratio 
is close to one, then it is more likely the component will fail without warning; if the 
median of the ratio is small, then the warning tends to be premature.   
For the parameters considered, results show sensor warnings improve 
availability and reduce long run average operating cost when the median of the 
random ratio of warning to failure time is 0.8 and the standard deviation of the 
ratio is less than 0.1; a sensor with these properties is called a good sensor. For 
a component with observable failures, if the mean repair time for failure is greater 
than three times the mean repair time for warning, operational availability 
increases by 3% to 4% with the sensor.  Long run average costs are reduced by 
one half with a good sensor.  For a component with non-observable failures, the 
sensor may have a greater beneficial effect on both operational availability and 
long run average cost since the sensor aids in eliminating component down time 
that occurs while waiting for inspection after the component has failed.  For the 
parameter values considered, availability increases up to 25% and the long run 
average costs are reduced by a factor of five in some cases depending on the 
median of the ratio of the mean time to warning to the mean time to failure.  The 
 xvi 
presence of a sensor increases the inter-inspection time that maximizes the 
operational availability.  If the ratio of the warning to failure time has a large 
variability, then the inter-inspection time maximizing the operational availability 
approaches that for a component with no sensor. 
Effective sensors that allow Condition Based Maintenance prognostic and 
diagnostic maintenance policies to be successful have the potential to increase 
operational availability and reduce long run average costs.  In situations where 
failures are observable, sensors can reduce catastrophic failures and the 
associated costs in time and money that go along with them by identifying a 
maintenance need based on the system’s condition.  In situations where 
observations are not observable and a component must be inspected to 
determine failure, a sensor can increase the inter-inspection time and warn of an 
impending failure eliminating the down time from when the component failed until 
the next scheduled inspection.  These increased inter-inspection times and 
warnings reduce the time the component is down, reduce long run average costs 
and increase operational availability. 
 xvii 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  MAINTENANCE EFFICIENCY THROUGH 
FOCUSED LOGISTICS 
A. BACKGROUND  
As a part of Joint Vision 2020, Focused Logistics is one of the elements 
required to create a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military 
operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000).  The Focused Logistics transformation 
has three components, one of which is Force-centric Logistic Enterprise (FLE).  
Force-centric Logistic Enterprise itself is composed of six initiatives: 
-Depot Maintenance Partnership 
-Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) 
-Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) 
-End to End Distribution 
-Executive Agents 
-Enterprise Integration 
The DoD has proposed to instantiate FLE initiatives by leveraging commercial 
sector successes, to accelerate achievement of key Focused Logistics 
capabilities, such as agile sustainment and information fusion. (U.S. Department 
of Defense Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
2004).   
 Of particular interest for this thesis is the CBM+ initiative. 
The CBM+ initiative covers a variety of technological and business 
changes designed to create a new maintenance environment in 
DOD. Projected changes focus on the vehicle platform with 
automated embedded sensor-based technologies providing 
standardized data in an integrated data environment.  These 
initiatives include enhanced prognostics and diagnostic techniques, 
failure and trend analysis, electronic portable or point of 




Identification Technology, and data-driven interactive training. (U.S. 
Department of Defense Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, 2004)   
CBM+ is an exciting and rapidly growing field.  Each of the services has 
incorporated this system concept on some of its platforms.  Each service names 
the maintenance policy uniquely but the same general methodology is behind 
each service’s approach. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
With this background as framework, the following question is considered:  
How many, or what components of a system need to be embedded with sensor 
based technologies to make a CBM+ type maintenance approach more 
beneficial than a traditional maintenance approach?  The objective of this thesis 
is limited to one component of a system, and investigates the effect of the quality 
of the sensor on operational availability and long run average cost.  Sensitivity 
analysis determines the benefits of the CBM+ maintenance approach over a 
range of a sensor’s detection ability. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II gives additional general background of maintenance 
approaches, describing reactive and proactive categories.  A short discussion of 
traditional and CBM+ types of maintenance practices is included.  Chapter III 
considers two situations.  In the first case, component failures are observable.  In 
the second case component failure is not observable; the state of the component 
can be addressed by inspection or with the output of a sensor.  Chapter III 
describes a mathematical model that represents the potential failure time of a 
component and a positively correlated warning time.  Included is definition of 
times required for, and costs of, performing a given maintenance policy.  Chapter 
IV applies the mathematical models developed in Chapter III to the different 
maintenance policies from Chapter II.  Chapter V presents an analysis of results 
obtained from the models, followed with conclusions and recommendations.   
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II. MAINTENANCE COSTS ARE A LARGE PORTION OF DOD 
OPERATION AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS  
A. O&S COSTS ARE A LARGE PORTION OF TOTAL LIFE CYCLE 
COSTS (LCC) 
The maintenance of weapon systems is expensive.  Over the life of a 
weapon system, operations and support costs comprise roughly 65-80% of the 
total life cycle costs (Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) Department of 
Defense (DoD) Guidebook May 2008).  Maintenance costs are typically a large 
percentage of those operational and support costs.  The cost of DoD 
maintenance in FY2007 was more than $84 billion (2008 DoD Maintenance 
Factbook).  This maintenance work was conducted by more than 650,000 military 
and civilian maintainers who, along with several thousand commercial repair 
companies, supported 280 ships, 14,000 aircraft, 800 strategic missiles and 
370,000 ground combat and tactical vehicles.   The cost comes from both the 
training and support of personnel conducting the maintenance as well as the 
materiel required to replace or repair items that appear to be damaged or 
degraded. 
B. MANY WAYS TO IMPLEMENT A MAINTENANCE POLICY 
Maintenance approaches are varied.  Figure 2 displays reactive and 
proactive maintenance categories.  Proactive categories consist of preventive 




Figure 2.   Maintenance Approaches (From: U.S. Department of Defense Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, 2008) 
C. TRADITIONAL MAINTENANCE POLICIES ARE NOT ALWAYS 
EFFICIENT 
Traditionally, maintenance approaches are categorized as reactive or 
proactive.  Reactive (corrective) maintenance is conducted when a system fails.  
Proactive (preventive scheduled) maintenance is conducted according to a policy 
of inspections, repairs, and replacements based on component age.  Reactive 
maintenance is performed on components selected to run to failure or on those 
that fail in an unplanned or unscheduled manner.  Reactive maintenance is 
normally unscheduled since the failures occur unpredictably.  Preventive 
maintenance can be based on calendar time, equipment-operating time or after a 
certain number of events or cycles.  Preventive maintenance may be either 
scheduled or unscheduled.  That is, preventive maintenance may be based on 
predetermined inspection time intervals or unscheduled after detection of a 
condition that may lead to failure or degraded performance of a system.  A 
preventive policy of maintenance may result in inefficiencies by requiring the 
replacement or inspection of parts or components of systems prior to established 
need for inspection or replacement. 
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D. TECHNOLOGY CAN ENABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN MAINTENANCE 
EFFICIENCY 
The use of technology potentially improves maintenance efficiency.  The 
ability to monitor system and component operations without being intrusive, or 
degrading performance, has increased the use of predictive diagnostic 
maintenance practices.  As of December 2007 DoD policy is: “Condition Based 
Maintenance Plus (CBM+)  must be included in the selection of maintenance 
concepts, technologies, and processes for all new weapon systems, equipment 
and materiel programs based on readiness requirements, life-cycle cost goals 
and Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) based functional analysis”  (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2007).  Maintenance that is more efficient will result in 
significant savings and reduced life cycle costs. 
Condition based maintenance is a method of scheduling/conducting 
maintenance when needed, in time to prevent serious incapacitation or 
catastrophic failure of a system, and to improve system availability at lower cost.  
As defined in DoD Instruction 4151.22,  
CBM is a maintenance strategy based on equipment operational 
experience derived from analysis. CBM+ includes maintenance 
processes and capabilities derived from real-time or approximate 
real-time assessments of the condition of subsystems obtained 
from embedded sensors and/or external tests and measurements 
using either portable equipment or actual inspection.  The objective 
of CBM+ is to suggest and diagnose maintenance need based on 
the evidence of need, while ensuring safety, reliability, availability, 
and reduced total ownership cost. (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2007)  
E. CBM+ LEVERAGES TECHNOLOGY TO MAKE MAINTENANCE MORE 
EFFICIENT 
CBM+ uses technology to measure the condition of the components of a 
system. Components without monitoring sensors may need to be inspected 
periodically. The component is repaired when the sensor indicates failure is 
imminent or replaced when inspection indicates a failure has occurred.  The use 
of sensors may decrease the number of inspections and preventive maintenance 
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time needed for the system.  This practice invites the question: How many 
components of a system should be monitored and how does it affect the long run 
average time a system is up or functioning? 
CBM+, when properly implemented, can reduce the need for inspections 
and age-based replacement or repair.  Improper use of CBM+ results in 
overloading maintenance operations with unneeded repairs and replacements.  
Furthermore, infrequent sensor/inspection warnings fail to avert true failures.  
This suggests the possible existence of a “best” degree of monitoring. 
This analysis examines the question:   
How timely and accurate must sensors be to increase a component’s 
average operational availability?  Satisfactory performance means a sensor’s 
ability to consistently predict failures in a timely manner: not too late and not too 
early.  
The cost of the sensors and the component’s long run average up time or 
availability are studied as well as the long run average maintenance cost of the 
component.  Gauthier (2006) discusses some attributes of a component that 
make it a candidate for sensor monitoring.  Many important factors are identified. 
-Sensing is preferred for a component that fails often vice rarely. 
-Failure of the component should have relatively severe consequences. 
-Direct physical inspection of a candidate component should be relatively 
difficult or resource intensive. 
-A sensor must be feasible and appropriate for the component and not 
degrade the component’s performance.   
-Time from warning to failure should be long enough to take corrective 
action. 
-A sensor must be reliable and require minimum maintenance. 
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Implementation of CBM+ on components with these characteristics results in the 
best possibility of increasing availability and reducing operating cost. 
F. METRICS HELP DEFINE AND EVALUATE APPROPRIATE 
APPLICATION OF A CBM+ POLICY 
To determine the performance of CBM+, four metrics have been 
established by DoD as life cycle sustainment outcome metrics: 
1. Materiel availability measures the percentage of total inventory of a 
system that is operationally capable of performing an assigned mission at a given 
time, based on material condition.  One interpretation is the number of 
operationally capable end items divided by the total population.  Materiel 
availability may also be defined as the percentage of time a system is 
operationally capable of performing an assigned mission, this measure can be 
expressed as the mean uptime of a system divided by the sum of mean system 
uptime and downtime; this measure is sometimes called operational availability, 
OA . 
2. Materiel reliability is the probability a system will perform without 
failure over a specific interval.  Reliability must support a specified warfighting 
capability. 
3. Ownership cost balances the sustainment solution by ensuring the 
O&S costs associated with materiel readiness.  Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group’s O&S Cost Estimating Structure supports this key system attribute (U.S. 
Department of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group, 1992). 
4. Mean down time is the average time required to restore an asset to 
its full operational capabilities.  Mean down time includes the time from the report 
of a down (not operational) asset until the time the asset returns to an operational 
state (U.S. Department of Defense Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Material Readiness, 2008). 
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III. SYSTEM FAILURES AND WARNINGS CAN BE MODELED 
MATHEMATICALLY 
A. TIMES TO FAILURES MODELED AS RANDOM VARIABLES  
1. The Exponential Distribution 
The exponential distribution is one probability model used to represent 
interarrival times between random events.  The exponential distribution is not 
always the best distribution to model failure times but is often a convenient 
starting point.  The exponential distribution has the property that it is 
“memoryless”; that is, the conditional distribution that a failure occurs within the 
next s  time units is independent of the age of the system and so an age 
replacement policy is not useful.  
For the scope of this thesis, failure times are exponentially distributed 





 .  Since exponentially distributed random variables are memoryless, age 
replacement policies are not considered. 
B. WARNINGS MODELED AS PREDICTIVE OF FAILURES  
1. Sensors Warn of Impending Failure 
Ideally, warnings of an impending failure occur before the failure happens 
and early enough to allow sufficient time to fix a problem before the failure leads 
to catastrophe.  In modeling this behavior, consideration is given to the fact that 
the sensor will not always detect an impending failure and so the warning or the 
indication might occur too late.  There are often many modes of failure that need 
to be considered in complex systems and numerous warnings for those different 
modes.  In this thesis, the sensor’s warning time will be positively correlated with 
the failure time.  The warning time is modeled in the following manner: 
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Let FT be an exponential random variable representing the time of failure 
and WT be the random variable representing the time of the warning.  We 
assume: 
 W FT T  (3.1) 
 
where   is a non-negative random variable independent of FT ; note that   is 
the ratio of the warning time to the failure time.  This model allows for warning 
times to be a known fraction of failure time if   is a constant between zero and 
one.  For example, if   is equal to one, then the warning signal would occur as 
the failure was occurring.  The model allows for the possibility of failures to occur 
without a warning; if   is greater than one then the component fails without 
warning.  While it is not likely, in reality, that a warning would go off after a plane 
has crashed, this model representation does allow for modeling the absence of a 
warning prior to failure due to a poor sensor.  For this thesis the ratio of warning 
to failure time,  , is an independent Weibull random variable with scale 
parameter   and shape parameter   where the Weibull distribution probability 
density function (pdf) is defined as: 
 
1 1 ( )
0 0




























The parameters of the Weibull distribution are specified by the shape parameter 
and the median.  A large range of sensor performance can be investigated 
utilizing the versatility of the shape of the Weibull distribution by choosing   and 
  appropriately.  Appendix B displays selected graphs of Weibull pdfs as well as 
the equations for the mean, median and variance.  The covariance of ,F WT T is 
also included for each of the parameters ,   used in the thesis.   
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C. TIME AND COSTS FOR COMPONENT FAILURES, WARNINGS AND, 
REPLACEMENT OR REPAIR 
For the scope of the thesis, consideration is given to the time and expense 
of inspection, repair, and replacement of a system component.  These times and 
costs are considered as input variables to determine of the effectiveness of 
instituting a proactive CBM+ type of maintenance for a given component with a 
parameter defined sensor.  Table 1 describes the input variables. 
 
Parameter Description 
Ir  Expected Time required to conduct scheduled inspection 
Fr  Expected Time required to conduct maintenance due to a failure 
Wr  Expected Time required to conduct maintenance due to a 
warning 
Ic  Expected Cost to conduct a scheduled inspection 
Fc  Expected Cost required to conduct maintenance due to a failure 
Wc  Expected Cost required to conduct maintenance due to a 
warning 
FT  Random variable having an exponential distribution representing 
a time of failure 
WT  Random variable representing a time of warning 
Table 1.   Time and Cost Parameters 
 12 
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IV. MODEL CHOICES FOR MAINTENANCE  
A. CYCLE TIMES 
Renewal reward processes are used to compute operational availability 
and long run average costs for different maintenance policies.  The renewal 
reward process allows for conveniently computing these values.  “For a cycle that 
is completed every time a renewal occurs, the long run average reward per unit 
time is equal to the expected reward earned during a cycle divided by the 
expected length of a cycle” (Ross, 2007).  For determining the component 
operational availability of different maintenance policies, the reward is the time 
the system is up during a cycle and the cycle time is that time between the 
inspections, warnings or failures depending on the model. 
B. MAINTENANCE MODELS DESCRIBED MATHEMATICALLY WHEN 
FAILURES ARE OBSERVABLE 
1. Run to Failure Model (RTF) 
The RTF model is a traditional maintenance policy model.  It is assumed 
failures of the component are observable.  The run to failure cycle length is the 
time between failures.  The operational availability is simply the mean amount of 
time the component is up divided by the sum of mean up and mean down times.  
Figure 3 displays this graphically while equation (4.1) describes this model 
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FcE Long Run AverageCost
E CycleTime
  (4.2) 
2. Sensor Based Predictive Model (Sensors) 
The sensor only model incorporates only warnings and failures to define 
its cycle times.  Failures are observable.  A graphical depiction of this model is 
Figure 4.  The up time is the minimum of the time until a warning or failure.  The 
cycle time is that minimum time plus the time due to repair from a warning or a 
failure depending on which event occurs.  Equations (4.3) and (4.4) display 
operational availability and long run average cost equations respectively.  Further 
details on the derivation of these equations are found in Appendix C. 
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where  E R is the expected time of repair and is expressed as follows: 
 
   { } { } 1W F W F W F W FE P r P r e r r e
          
 
R T T T T  (4.5) 
 
 
C. MAINTENANCE MODELS FOR A COMPONENT WITH NON-
OBSERVABLE FAILURES 
1. Scheduled Maintenance Model (Inspections) 
In this model, the failures of the component are not observable.  The 
condition of the component can only be determined by inspection.  When the 
component fails, the component is down until its next inspection and a working 
component is down during its inspection.  Since the lifetime of the component 
has an exponential distribution, the Scheduled Maintenance model has cycle 
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times that are a sum of the inter-inspection time, T , and repair time.  A graphical 
depiction of the situation is Figure 5. The mathematical expressions for 
operational availability and long run average cost are given in equations (4.5) 
and (4.6) respectively.  The inspections will find the system in an operating or 
failed state and repair as required.  For the purpose of this thesis, failures 
resulting from inspection are not considered.  This assumption makes it a best-
case scenario for comparison against other maintenance methods.  Appendix D 
presents the derivation of equations (4.5) and (4.6). 
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E CycleTime
     (4.6) 
 
For this model, an optimal inspection time that maximizes operational 
availability can be calculated by taking the derivative with respect to T  of (4.5), a 
concave function, setting it equal to zero, and solving numerically.  The optimal 
inspection time can also be approximated using a Taylor series expansion, 
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1Te T     and solving (4.5) for T , the result appears in equation (4.7).  The 















  (4.7) 
Results from this approximation compared to the numerically calculated values 
are in Table 2 and displayed graphically in Figure 6 for various values of the 
mean time to conduct an inspection Ir ; the mean repair time for a failure, 2Fr  , 
for all cases.  Due to the flat nature of the availability curve, the optimal T  
approximations are low while the operational availability values are in close 
proximity.  The inter-inspection time that maximizes the operational availability is 
found by search over the time interval from 0 to 300 with a grid of one time unit. 
 
For 2Fr   Numerical Result Approximation 
 Optimal T OA  Optimal T OA  
1Ir   14 0.86 9.5 0.85 
2Ir   19 0.81 13.2 0.80 
3Ir   24 0.78 15.9 0.77 
4Ir   27 0.75 18.1 0.74 




Figure 6.   Plot of Availability for Given Inter-Inspection Intervals 
2. Inspection and Sensor Predictive Model (Inspections & 
Sensors) 
Although not a purely predictive model, this model with inspections and 
sensor is a transitional type of maintenance that might be used as a purely 
predictive maintenance policy is implemented.  It is assumed that failures are not 
directly observable and can only be detected by inspection.  For this case, the 
sensor may provide warning of impending failure.  The system also is inspected 
at fixed intervals of time, T .  The component is repaired to as good as new 
whenever a warning occurs or when the system is found failed during an 
inspection.  When the component fails without warning the component is down 
until its next inspection.  Figure 7 represents this model.  Equations (4.8) and 
(4.9) display the operational availability and long run average cost respectively; 
G  is the distribution of the ratio of the warning to repair time,  .  Appendix E 
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gives details of the derivation of (4.8) and (4.9).  The integrals are evaluated 
numerically using Gaussian quadrature with 24 points  (Abramowitz M., 1972). 
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D. COMMON FACTORS FOR TRADITIONAL AND CBM+ MAINTENANCE 
PROCESSES 
For each of the maintenance policies, measures described in Chapter II 
determine the metrics that evaluate the efficiency of the maintenance that is 
performed.  For the scope of this thesis, factors considered are the time between 
inspections or inter-inspection time, the expected time to conduct an inspection, 
the expected repair time due to warning, and the expected repair time due to 
failure.  Similarly, the cost factors are expected costs of inspection, of repair due 
to warning and of repair due to failure.  In the following numerical examples, the 
component failure rate is 0.01   which for an exponential distribution 







 time units.  
The expected cost or repair time required due to a warning is fixed and equal to 2 
for all cases.  Failure and inspection expected costs and times are varied with 
values displayed in Table 3.  Since the point of a CBM+ type maintenance policy 
is to reduce cost and increase availability, consideration is not given to cases 
where it is more expensive to warn than to fail.  This thesis also assumes that 
there is no cost for the sensor; this is an unrealistic assumption, which is 
addressed in the conclusions and recommendations section.  However, expected 
inspection costs both more and less expensive than expected repair costs due to 









 Mean Repair Time and Cost Values (for these cases 
the values will be equal) 
Cases 
Considered 
Inspection Warning Failure 
1 1 2 2 
2 1 2 3 
3 1 2 4 
4 1 2 5 
5 1 2 6 
6 1 2 7 
7 2 2 2 
8 2 2 3 
9 2 2 4 
10 2 2 5 
11 2 2 6 
12 2 2 7 
13 3 2 2 
14 3 2 3 
15 3 2 4 
16 3 2 5 
17 3 2 6 
18 3 2 7 
19 4 2 2 
20 4 2 3 
21 4 2 4 
22 4 2 5 
23 4 2 6 
24 4 2 7 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 23 
V. ANALYSIS OF MODEL RESULTS:  CBM+ CAN BE 
BENEFICIAL WHEN APPLIED APPROPRIATELY  
A. CBM+ SHOWS IMPROVEMENT OVER TRADITIONAL REACTIVE AND 
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE BASED ON AVAILABILITY MEASURE 
OF PERFORMANCE (MOP) 
The values displayed in the tables of this chapter are a selection of model 
results from Appendix A.  In Appendix A are the results computed using the 
equations in Chapter IV for each of the maintenance polices for each of the 
cases listed in Table 3 and the parameters for the Weibull random variable as 
listed in Appendix F.  For those maintenance policies that include inspection, the 
inter-inspection time that maximizes the operational availability is found by 
search over the time interval from 0 to 300 with a grid of one time unit.  Integrals 
are evaluated numerically using Gaussian quadrature with 24 points. 
Table 4 displays results for case 5 from Table 3; in this case, there is a 
large expected time to repair due to failure and a small expected time to conduct 
inspections.  The Weibull random variable with shape parameter 10 is 
considered at three different values of the median of the ratio of warning to failure 
times: 0.5, 0.8, and 0.9.  These values represent a consistent sensor since the 
variance is quite low, approximately 0.01.  Appendix B, Figure 13 displays the 
density function for these Weibull distributions with shape parameter 10.  Two 
scenarios are displayed in Table 4: in one, the failure is observable and in the 
other the failure is not observable.  For the case in which failure is observable, an 
operational availability of 94% results from a traditional run to failure 
maintenance policy.  The presence of a sensor increases the availability 2% to 
3%.  In this case the sensor maintenance policy attains 2% to 3% higher 
availability depending on the sensor’s ability to detect impending failures 
consistently for the given median value. 
When failures are not observable, the policy of inspection and sensor 
attains at least a 9% higher availability than inspection alone.  Of note here is the 
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fact that when the median of the ratio of warning to failure times is 0.5 the 
probability a warning comes before failure is 1, so the optimal inspection policy 
with the sensor is to never inspect.  Note that the presence of the sensor 
increases the inter-inspection time that maximizes the operational availability.  
The decrease in operational availability when the median ratio of warning to 
failure times is = 0.9 is the result of warnings not occurring before failure and the 
resulting down time between the failure time and the next inspection. 
 
 =10  
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.5 
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.8 
Median of ratio of 




















 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.94 N/A 0.94 N/A 0.94 N/A 
Sensor 0.96 N/A 0.97 N/A 0.97 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.83 14 0.83 14 0.83 14 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
.96   0.97 242 0.92 34 
 W FP T T  1.00 0.999 0.578 
Table 4.   Availability for Case 5 when Shape Parameter is 10  
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Again, consider the shape parameter equal to 10 with the three different 
values for the median of the ratio of warning to failure times.  Table 5 displays 
results for Case 21 from Table 3 when the mean time to repair due to failure as 
well as the mean time to conduct an inspection is twice that of mean repair time 
due to warning.  For the case in which failures are observable the maximum 
improvement achieved with a sensor is about a one and a half percent 
improvement over the traditional run to failure policy.  The policies for a 
component whose failures are not observable can give up to a 20% increase in 
availability.  Here the benefit of the sensor is greater because the sensor may 
give a warning to indicate impending failure and so eliminates the down time 
from the failure of the component until the next inspection.  Note that the 
presence of a sensor increases the inter-inspection time that maximizes the 
operational availability.  Comparison with the results of Table 5 suggests that the 
increase in the mean time to conduct an inspection has resulted in the increase 














 =10  
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.5 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.8 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 



















 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.96 N/A 0.96 N/A 0.96 N/A 
Sensor 0.96 N/A 0.975 N/A 0.975 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.74 27 0.74 27 0.84 27 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
.96*   0.971 242 0.89 64 
 W FP T T  1.00 0.999 0.578 
Table 5.   Availability for Case 21 when Shape Parameter is 10 
Additional investigation is conducted using a model of a sensor that has 
more variation in the ratio of the warning to the failure time as represented by a 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.25.  Table 6 displays the operational 
availabilities of the different maintenance policies for case 5, where mean time to 
conduct an inspection is 1/6th that of the mean repair time due to failure; the 
mean repair time due to warning is 1/3rd that of a mean repair time due to failure.  
Comparison with Tables 4 and 5 for a sensor with a shape parameter of 10 
suggests there is nothing gained by adding a sensor to the component when 
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failure is observable; in fact, there is a decrease in operational availability 
presumably due to premature warnings.  When failures are not observable the 
component availability with a sensor is approximately the same as without a 
sensor.  Further the maximizing inter-inspection intervals are about the same 
with and without a sensor. 
 
 = 0.25  
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.5 
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.8 
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.9 












 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.943 N/A 0.943 N/A 0.943 N/A 
Sensor 0.933 N/A 0.935 N/A 0.935 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.828 14 0.828 14 0.828 14 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
0.83* 15 0.83 15 0.83 15 
 W FP T T  0.56 0.52 0.51 
Table 6.   Availability for Case 5 when Shape Parameter is 0.25  
Table 7 displays the operational availabilities of the different maintenance 
policies for case 21 when the shape parameter is 0.25; the mean time to conduct 
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an inspection is equal to the mean repair time due to failure; and the mean repair 
time due to warning is half that of a mean repair time due to failure.  Results here 
show that when a sensor is utilized the operational availability decreases when 
failures are observable.  When the failures are not observable, the operational 
availability increases marginally; in this case about 1%. 
 
 = 0.25  
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.5 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.8 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.9 












 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.962 N/A 0.962 N/A 0.962 N/A 
Sensor 0.948 N/A 0.950 N/A 0.950 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.741 27 0.741 27 0.741 27 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
0.751 29 0.751 29 0.750 29 
 W FP T T  0.56 0.52 0.51 
Table 7.   Availability for Case 21 when Shape Parameter is 0.25  
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B. COMPARISON OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
For this section, we assume the component’s failure is not observable.  
Table 8 displays operational availabilities for two cases; one in which the sensor 
ratio of warning to failure time,  , is constant and the other in which   has a 
Weibull distribution with a large shape parameter and median equal to the 
constant.  
To ensure the results of the stochastic model are reasonable for the 
maintenance policy that includes both Sensor and Inspection two models are 
compared.  In one model the probability   equals 0.9 (respectively 0.5) is 1.  The 
operational availability is compared to that of a model in which   has a Weibull 
distribution with a median of 0.9 and a shape parameter of 30 (respectively a 
median of 0.5 and shape parameter of 5).  A sample of the results for given inter-
inspection intervals, T  , are displayed in Table 8 below; the values over the rest 
of the considered range are similar in their proximity.  The numbers are similar 
because of equal medians and the large shape parameter values.  Additional 












 Constant     having a 
Weibull 
Distribution 













1 0.49587 0.49584 0.49260 0.49251 
2 0.65933 0.65929 0.65357 0.65341 
3 0.74072 0.74067 0.73344 0.73324 
4 0.78945 0.78938 0.78117 0.78094 
5 0.82188 0.82181 0.81290 0.81265 
6 0.84503 0.84495 0.83551 0.83525 
Table 8.   Operational Availability 
C. CBM+ MAINTENANCE METHODS DECREASE COSTS 
The use of a sensor to detect impending failures has the opportunity to 
decrease costs when failures are observed and even more so when failures can’t 
be observed.  The inter-inspection time that minimizes the long run average cost 
is found by search over the time interval from 0 to 300 with a grid of one time 
unit.  Integrals are evaluated numerically using Gaussian quadrature with 24 
points. 
The first example is case 3 of Table 3 with shape parameter 10; the 
values are displayed in Table 9. The long run average cost (LRAC) for policies 
when failures are observable is 1 minus the availability since the mean costs are 
the same as the mean times.  This is not true for the policies for components 
whose failures are not observable.  We first discuss the case when failures are 
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observable.  For this example, when the median ratio of warning time to failure 
time is 0.8 or 0.9, the long run average cost of Run to Failure is roughly 1.5 times 
more than that with a sensor, (0.038/0.025 ~ 1.5).  When the median ratio is 0.5 
the long run average costs are about the same as that for the component without 
a sensor.  For the case in which failures are not observable, the long run average 
cost of an inspection policy without a sensor can be two to three times more than 
that with a sensor.  The presence of a sensor increases the inter-inspection 
interval that minimizes long run average cost.  
 
Table 9.   Long Run Average Costs for Case 3 when Shape Parameter is 10 
 =10  
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.5 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.8 
Median of ratio of 














 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.038 N/A 0.038 N/A 0.038 N/A 
Sensor 0.039 N/A 0.025 N/A 0.025 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.098 14 0.098 14 0.098 14 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
0.039   0.026 197 0.048 34 
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Table 10 displays a second example of case 3 of Table 3 when the shape 
parameter is 0.25. For the case when failures are observable, the cost of Run to 
Failure is roughly 3/4 the cost of the sensor policy, (0.038/0.052 ~ 0.73) for all 
medians; this is the result of premature failures.  With non-observable failures, 
this case shows that the long run average cost of an inspection policy without a 
sensor is about 95% of that with a sensor (0.098/0.103  ~ 0.95).  The minimizing 
inter-inspection times are about the same with and without a sensor.  A sensor 
whose warning time has this much variability negligibly decreases the long run 
average cost. 
Table 10.   Long Run Average Costs for Case 3 when Shape Parameter is 0.25 
 = 0.25  
Median of ratio of 
warning to failure 
time= 0.5 
Median of ratio 
of warning to 
failure time= 0.8 
Median of ratio of 














 Failure Observable 
Run To 
Failure 
0.038 N/A 0.038 N/A 0.038 N/A 
Sensor 0.052 N/A 0.050 N/A 0.050 N/A 
 Failure Not Observable 
Inspections 0.098 14 0.098 14 0.098 14 
Inspections 
& Sensor 
0.104 15 0.103 15 0.102 15 
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D. SENSOR PARAMETER CHARACTERISTICS AND PREVENTING 
COMPONENT FAILURE DURING A MISSION 
Another measure of performance for the sensor is how much time elapses 
between the warning and the failure.  If a warning occurs too soon, extra 
maintenance is required; however, if it occurs too late the failure may occur 
before the mission is complete.  A simulation to determine the effect of the 
sensor on completing missions without failure was conducted; details of the 
simulation appear in Appendix F.  The Weibull distribution for the warning time 
has parameter values listed in Table 11.  The length of a mission is 2 time units 
throughout.  The number of replications is 10,000.  The simulation utilizes the 
Mersenne Twister random number generator (Matsumoto M., 2003).  The third 
column of Table 11 displays the fraction of missions with a warning that also 
include a failure.  The fourth column displays the standard error of the third 
column. The fifth column displays the average number of missions without failure 
after the warning not to include the mission having the failure or the mission with 







































0.5 0.038 0.002 11.6 0.0007 
0.8 0.042 0.002 10.3 0.0006 
0.9 0.042 0.002 10.0 0.0006 
0.5 
0.5 0.035 0.002 10.7 0.0005 
0.8 0.042 0.002 8.3 0.0004 
0.9 0.043 0.002 7.8 0.0004 
1.0 
0.5 0.03 0.002 10.2 0.0005 
0.8 0.04 0.002 6.1 0.0003 
0.9 0.05 0.002 5.4 0.0003 
2 
0.5 0.02 0.001 12.2 0.0006 
0.8 0.04 0.002 4.5 0.0002 
0.9 0.05 0.002 3.4 0.002 
5 
0.5 0.02 0.001 19.4 0.001 
0.8 0.03 0.001 3.9 0.0001 
0.9 0.05 0.002 1.8 0.0001 
10 
0.5 0.02 0.001 21.8 0.002 
0.8 0.03 0.001 5.6 0.0003 
0.9 0.06 0.002 1.5 0.00001 
Table 11.   Sensor Effect on Mission Times of Length Two 
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The importance of the median of the ratio of the warning time to the failure 
time is apparent from the results of Table 11.  For example, when the shape 
parameter is 10 and median of the ratio is 0.9, then 6% of the missions with a 
warning will have a failure in the same mission; while if the median ratio is 0.5 
then there is only about a 2% probability of a failure occurring during a mission 
that has a warning.  For a fixed Weibull shape parameter, the fraction of missions 
with a warning that also have a failure is nondecreasing as the median of the 
ratio of warning to failure time increases; the mean number of additional missions 
without failure after the warning decreases as the median of the ratio increases.  
For fixed median of the ratio the mean number of additional missions without 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS:  HOW MUCH BETTER CAN CBM+ BE 
THAN TRADITIONAL MAINTENANCE? 
A. CBM+ AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE POLICIES 
Preventive maintenance can be both cost effective and improve the 
operational availability of components when properly applied.  However, if the 
sensor tends to give premature warnings or no warning at all, then the sensor 
use will decrease operational availability and increase long run average 
maintenance costs. 
We first discuss the case of observable failures.  Table 12 displays 1 
minus the ratio of the component’s operational availability with and without a 
sensor.  The parameters of the Weibull distribution are along the left side and the 
cases, from Table 3, being considered are across the top.  When failures are not 
observed the inspection times/costs do not contribute to operational availability; 
hence the multiple cases listed at the top of each column.  Negative values result 
when the operational availability of the component with a sensor is less than that 
without a sensor; this can occur when the shape parameter of the ratio of 
warning to failure time distribution is small which results in greater warning time 
variability with resulting premature warnings and failures without warnings.  
Results presented in Tables 4 through 7 and Appendix A suggests that when 
failures are observable, three parameters influence the use of sensor warning 
times to increase operational availability.  One parameter is the ratio of the mean 
repair time due to failure and that due to warning; if the ratio is close to one, then 
the sensor adds little value.  The second parameter is the median of the Weibull 
distribution of the ratio of warning to failure time; the closer the median is to one, 
the more likely that the component will fail without warning.  The third parameter 
is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution of the ratio of warning to failure 
time; this parameter influences the variability of the warning time; large variability 
can result in premature warning or no warning at all.  For the parameter values 
presented, the addition of a sensor increases the operational availability when 
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the mean repair time for failures is greater than three times that for warnings; the 
shape parameter of the Weibull distribution for the ratio of warning to failure is 
greater than 2; and the Weibull median is either 0.8 or 0.9; we call a sensor with 
these properties a good sensor. 
From the data developed in the previous chapter consideration for using 
sensors on components when failures are observable should be given when the 
time of repair is greater than three times that which results from a warning.  If a 
sensor can predict better than roughly 80% of failures with a median ratio of the 
warning to failure time about 80%, then a sensor should be considered.  For a 
good sensor, if the mean cost of repair due to failure is greater than three times 
the mean repair cost due to a warning, then the run to failure policy can be as 
much as twice as expensive.  The values for long run average costs are the 
same as 1 minus the operational availability since the same values of time and 
cost were used, Table 24, Appendix A displays the ratios of the long run average 
costs for these two maintenance methods. 
 
Table 12.   Comparison of Sensor and RTF Maintenance Policies on Availability. 
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When failures are not observable Table 13 displays 1 minus the ratio of 
the component’s maximum operational availability with inspection only to that for 
a policy with both inspection and a sensor.  Results from Tables 4 through 7 in 
Chapter V as well as Appendix A suggest that when failures are not observable 
five parameters influence the ability of a sensor to increase operational 
availability.  These parameters are the three parameters from the previous case 
when failures are observable as well as two other ratios.  Parameter four is the 
ratio of mean time required to conduct an inspection to the mean time required 
for repair due to failure.  The fifth parameter is the ratio of mean time to conduct 
an inspection to mean time required to repair due to a warning.  For fixed Weibull 
shape parameter and median, smaller ratios result in increases in operational 
availability.  
In Table 13 nearly all entries have positive values reflecting an increased 
operational availability with the use of the sensor.  The exception is for cases 1-3 
when the shape parameter is 0.25.  The inspection only policy has a higher 
operational availability when the shape parameter of Weibull distribution of the 
ratio of warning to failure times is small.  This is due to the greater warning time 
variability resulting from the small shape parameter.  Additionally, for these cases 
the mean time to conduct an inspection is closest to the mean time to repair due 
to failure.  The rest of the Table entries show that the addition of a sensor 
improves the operational availability when a component’s failures are 
unobserved; this is due to the elimination of the down time from when the 
component fails until the next inspection. 
The ratio of the maximum long run average costs for inspection only to 
that of inspection and sensor are displayed in Table 25, Appendix A.  The results 
show that cost savings can be obtained when the Weibull shape parameter of the 
distribution of the ratio of warning to failure time is one or greater regardless of 




Table 13.   Comparison of Inspection and Inspection and Sensor Maintenance 
Policies on Availability. 
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B. FUTURE ANALYSIS 
1.  Model Refinement and Sensor Cost 
Refinement of the models to include increasing hazard failure time 
distributions with resulting age replacement policies remain to be investigated.  
Further models that include representation of component condition are of 
interest.  Models including more than one component monitored by a sensor are 
also of interest.  Future models should include the cost of a sensor and the 
maintenance cost of the sensor for systems having failures that are both 
observable and not observable.  
2.  Apply to specific systems 
Study of component wear and failure data with modes of failures and the 
performance of sensors to provide warning would produce more insight on the 
value of implementing Condition Based Maintenance policies for a given system.  
The author acknowledges that the difficult part of CBM+ is determining what 
constitutes a warning signal through the noise of the data collected. 
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APPENDIX A: ANALYTIC DATA OUTPUT 
Tables 14–21 display the output from the VBA code in Appendix G.  The 
parameters of the Weibull distribution are along the left side and the cases being 
considered are across the top, the numbers listed below the cases from Table 3 
are mean times or costs for Inspection, Warning, and Failure (I,W,F).  For each 
set of parameters, results for the four maintenance policies are listed.  Results in 
the table are operational availability, OA ; optimal inter-inspection time 
*T  (where 
appropriate); and long run average cost (LRAC) for the policy.  Where “INF” is 
listed as the optimal inspection time it represents an infinite inter-inspection 
interval and occurs when the probability that a warning occurs before a failure is 
one.  The repeating vertical order of the policies is failure is observable (Run to 




Table 14.   Data Output for Cases 1-6 part 1 
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Table 15.   Data Output for Cases 1-6 part 2 
 
Table 16.   Data Output for Cases 7-12 part 1 
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Table 17.   Data Output for Cases 7-12 part 2 
 




Table 19.   Data Output for Cases 13-18 part 2 
 
 




Table 21.   Data Output for Cases 19-24 part 2 
 
Tables 22–25 are comparison tables of the different maintenance policies.  
The tables compare availability and long run average cost for policies in which 
failures are observable and the policies when the failures are not observable.  
The parameters of the Weibull distribution are along the left side and the cases 
being considered, from Table 3, are across the top.  When failures are not 
observed, as in Tables 22 & 24, the inspection times/costs do not affect the 
availability or long run average cost; hence the multiple cases are listed at the 
top of each column. 
Table 22 displays 1 minus the ratio of the operational availability without a 
sensor to that with a sensor for a component whose failures are observable.  
Negative values result when the operational availability of the component with a 
sensor is less than that without a sensor due to premature warnings. 
Table 23 displays 1 minus the ratio of the maximum operational availability 
with only inspections to that with a sensor and inspections for a component 
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whose failures are not observable.  Negative values result when the maximum 
operational availability of the component with a sensor and inspections is less 
than that with inspections only due to sensor warnings being either too early or 
not occurring at all.   
Table 24 displays the ratio of the long run average cost without a sensor 
to that with a sensor for a component whose failures are observable; a ratio less 
than one indicates that the long run average cost with a sensor is greater than 
that without a sensor.   
Table 25 displays the ratio of the minimum long run average cost without a 
sensor to that with a sensor for a component whose failures are not observable; 
a ratio less than one indicates that the long run average cost with a sensor is 
greater than that without a sensor.   
 
 





Table 23.   Comparison of Inspection and Sensor & Inspection Maintenance Policies 
on Availability  
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Table 24.   Comparison of Sensor and Run to Failure Maintenance Policies on Long 




Table 25.   Comparison of Inspection and Sensor & Inspection Maintenance Policies 
on Long Run Average Cost  
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APPENDIX B SELECTED WEIBULL PLOTS 
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Density function plots for the Weibull random variables used in the thesis 
are displayed in the following tables.  For shape parameter less than one the first 
x value is 0.01, since zero gives an undefined value. 
 
Figure 8.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 0.25 
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Figure 9.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 0.5 
 
Figure 10.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 1.0 
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Figure 11.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 2.0 
 
Figure 12.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 5.0 
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Figure 13.   Weibull Random Variable with Shape Parameter 10 
The covariance and correlation of ,F WT T  are displayed in Table 26 below 
for each of the Weibull parameters used in the calculations. 
Shape Median 
Covariance 
,F WT T  
Correlation 
,F WT T  
0.25 
0.5 8108012 0.486 
0.8 12975630 0.486 
0.9 14594422 0.486 
0.5 
0.5 161863 0.753 
0.8 258883 0.753 
0.9 291280 0.753 
1.0 0.5 27100 0.911 
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0.8 43362 0.911 
0.9 48778 0.911 
2 
0.5 11539 0.973 
0.8 18462 0.973 
0.9 20769 0.973 
5 
0.5 6930 0.995 
0.8 11088 0.995 
0.9 12473 0.995 
10 
0.5 5834 0.999 
0.8 9334 0.999 
0.9 10501 0.999 
Table 26.   Covariance and Correlation of ,F WT T  
Table 27 displays characteristics for the Weibull random variables used to 
determine the warning time. 
 
Shape Median Mean P { WT < FT } Scale Variance 
0.25 
0.5 51.99 0.56 0.4617 1.86x105 
0.8 83.18 0.52 0.2885 4.77x105 
0.9 93.57 0.51 0.2565 6.04x105 
0.5 
0.5 2.08 0.62 0.9609 21.6605 
0.8 3.33 0.54 0.6006 55.4508 
0.9 3.75 0.52 0.5338 70.1800 
1.0 
0.5 0.72 0.75 1.3863 0.5203 
0.8 1.15 0.58 0.8664 1.3321 
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0.9 1.30 0.54 0.7702 1.6859 
2 
0.5 0.53 0.94 1.6651 0.0774 
0.8 0.85 0.66 1.0407 0.1981 
0.9 0.96 0.58 0.8516 0.2508 
5 
0.5 0.49 1.00 1.8586 0.0128 
0.8 0.79 0.88 1.1616 0.0328 
0.9 0.88 0.69 1.0326 0.0415 
10 
0.5 0.49 1.00 1.9280 0.0035 
0.8 0.79 0.99 1.2050 0.0090 
0.9 0.89 0.86 1.0711 0.0114 
Table 27.   Sensor Parameter Characteristics 
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APPENDIX C: SENSOR BASED PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE 
MODEL 
The failures are observable.  When there is a warning or failure, the 
component is replaced or repaired.  The expected up time is the expected value 
of the minimum of time to warning WT  and the time to failure FT . 
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The integral is numerically evaluated using Gaussian Quadrature. (Abramowitz 
M., 1972) 
The down time is the time needed to repair or replace the component. 
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The long run average time the system is up is 
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APPENDIX D: SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE MODEL 
The failure of the component is not directly observable.  The component 
must be inspected to determine failure, there is not a sensor.  For this model, the 
component is inspected periodically.  Each inspection of the component takes Ir  
time units; each repair/replacement of a failed component takes Fr  time units.  
When the component fails it is down until the next inspection. 
 Since the failure times are exponentially distributed, a cycle begins and 
ends at the end of each inspection and subsequent repair if needed.  The 
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To find the inter-inspection time, T , that maximizes the operational 
availability take the derivative of the concave function that defines the operational 




(1 ) (1 )
( ) 1[ ]
1 0
(1 ) ( (1 ))
1
( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
T T
T T I F
TF
FT T
I F I F
T T T T T T
F I F I F F
r r e T e
r e ed E
r e
dT E T r r e T r r e














     
 
                   

 





Solve for T  numerically.  In this thesis, the maximizing value of T  is found 
by evaluating the operational availability using a search over the time interval 
from 0 to 300  with grid of one time unit as well as using Microsoft Excel solver. 
Using a Taylor series expansion where 1Te T     gives the following 
approximation (note: generally the Taylor series expansion approximation is 
better when T  is close to zero): 
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The approximation to the maximizing inter-inspection time is the positive root.  
Table 28 displays results from this approximation and the maximizing inter-
inspection time.  The mean repair time due to failure is 2Fr   for all cases.  The 
results are displayed graphically in Figure 14.  Due to the flat nature of the 
availability curve, the approximations for the optimal T  are consistently lower 
than the optimal inter-inspection time.  However the operational availability 
resulting from the two inter-inspection times are close. 
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For 2Fr   Numerical Result Approximation 
1Ir   14 9.5 
2Ir   19 13.2 
3Ir   24 15.9 
4Ir   27 18.1 
Table 28.   Optimal and Approximately Optimal Inspection Intervals for Given Ir  
 
Figure 14.   Plot of Availability for Given Inspection Intervals; with circles 
surrounding the approximate maximizing inter-inspection interval. 
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APPENDIX E: SENSOR & INSPECTION BASED PREDICTIVE 
MAINTENANCE MODEL 
The failure of the component is not observable directly but only through 
inspection.  The component has a sensor which may provide warning of failure.  
There is also an inspection at fixed intervals of time, T , after each 
repair/replacement of the component.  The component is repaired to as good as 
new whenever a warning occurs or when the system is found failed during an 
inspection.  Again, if the component fails without warning, then it is down until its 
next inspection.  A cycle here begins and ends each time there is a warning or an 
inspection reveals a failure and the component is repaired 
 
The expected cycle time is 
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where G  is the distribution function of a Weibull random variable; 
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The expected down time is 
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The expected up time is 
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APPENDIX F: IMPACT OF SENSOR EFFECTIVENESS ON 
MISSION TIMES AND AVAILABILITY 
The following describes the simulation for effect of the sensor warnings on 
reducing component failure during a mission.  For given Weibull parameters 
consideration is given to the fraction of missions having a warning that also have 
a failure.  Additionally, the average number of missions that would follow the 
warning until failure occurs is determined.  Each simulation has 10,000 
replications.  A description of one replication of the simulation is: 
Specify a mission time m  
Draw exponential failure time, FT  
Draw Weibull random variable,  , if 1   then there is no warning and   
is redrawn until 1  (only replications with warning before failure are 
considered). 
When 1   do the following 







number of missions without warning; warning will occur 







number of missions without failure; failure will occur on 
mission 1FN   
If F WN N  record a failure during the mission in which the warning 
occurred. 
The simulation is replicated 10,000 times. 
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The fraction of missions with a warning and a failure
#
10,000
F Wof times N N  
The number of additional successful missions without failure is computed 















APPENDIX G: ADDITIONAL COMPARISON OF ANALYTICAL 
RESULTS 
Further results of Table 8 Operational Availability from Chapter V Section 
B are displayed here. 
 Constant     having a 
Weibull 
Distribution 













1 0.49587 0.49584 0.49260 0.49251 
2 0.65933 0.65929 0.65357 0.65341 
3 0.74072 0.74067 0.73344 0.73324 
4 0.78945 0.78938 0.78117 0.78094 
5 0.82188 0.82181 0.81290 0.81265 
6 0.84503 0.84495 0.83551 0.83525 
7 0.86237 0.86229 0.85245 0.85217 
8 0.87585 0.87577 0.86560 0.86531 
9 0.88663 0.88654 0.87611 0.87581 
10 0.89544 0.89535 0.88469 0.88439 
11 0.90278 0.90269 0.89184 0.89152 
12 0.90899 0.90890 0.89788 0.89756 
13 0.91431 0.91422 0.90305 0.90272 
14 0.91892 0.91882 0.90753 0.90719 
15 0.92295 0.92285 0.91144 0.91110 
16 0.92650 0.92641 0.91489 0.91454 
17 0.92966 0.92956 0.91795 0.91759 
18 0.93248 0.93239 0.92068 0.92032 
19 0.93502 0.93493 0.92314 0.92278 
20 0.93732 0.93722 0.92536 0.92499 
21 0.93941 0.93931 0.92737 0.92700 
22 0.94131 0.94122 0.92921 0.92884 
23 0.94306 0.94296 0.93089 0.93051 
24 0.94466 0.94456 0.93243 0.93205 
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25 0.94614 0.94604 0.93386 0.93347 
26 0.94751 0.94741 0.93517 0.93478 
27 0.94878 0.94869 0.93639 0.93600 
28 0.94997 0.94987 0.93752 0.93713 
29 0.95107 0.95097 0.93858 0.93818 
30 0.95210 0.95200 0.93956 0.93916 
31 0.95307 0.95297 0.94048 0.94008 
32 0.95398 0.95388 0.94135 0.94094 
33 0.95483 0.95473 0.94216 0.94175 
34 0.95563 0.95553 0.94292 0.94251 
35 0.95639 0.95629 0.94364 0.94322 
36 0.95711 0.95701 0.94432 0.94390 
37 0.95779 0.95769 0.94496 0.94453 
38 0.95843 0.95833 0.94556 0.94514 
39 0.95904 0.95894 0.94614 0.94571 
40 0.95962 0.95952 0.94668 0.94625 
41 0.96017 0.96007 0.94720 0.94677 
42 0.96070 0.96060 0.94769 0.94726 
43 0.96120 0.96110 0.94816 0.94772 
44 0.96168 0.96158 0.94861 0.94817 
45 0.96214 0.96204 0.94903 0.94859 
46 0.96258 0.96247 0.94944 0.94900 
47 0.96300 0.96289 0.94983 0.94938 
48 0.96340 0.96329 0.95020 0.94975 
49 0.96378 0.96368 0.95056 0.95010 
50 0.96415 0.96405 0.95090 0.95044 
Table 29.   Additional Comparison of Analytical Results 
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APPENDIX H: VBA CODE 
'File Name:  All_in_One 
' 
'Created: April May 2009 ( Naval Postgraduate School) 
'This program is used to calculate availability and long run average cost of 
'different maintenance policies given certain inputs. 
' 
'Author:  Maj Pete Koeneman with some code written by Professor P.A. Jacobs (Thank 
You!) 
' 
'  Some input variables used throughout the program 
Public alpha As Double                     'Weibull scale parameter 
Public beta As Double                        'Weibull shape parameter 
Public cweib As Double                      'Frequently used constant  
Public lambda As Double                  'Exponential parameter for failure rate 
Public InspTime As Double               'Inspection Time interval 
Public TTC As Double                        'Time to Consider for simulation 
Public rI As Double                             'Expected time to complete Inspection 
Public rW As Double                           'Expected time to complete repair due to Warning 
Public rF As Double                            'Expected time to complete repair due to Failure 
Public cI As Double                             'Expected cost to complete Inspection 
Public cW As Double                          'Expected cost to complete repair due to Warning 
Public cF As Double                            'Expected cost to complete repair due to Failure 
Public Mt As Double                           'Mission Time 
Public IntegralyDens01 As Double     'Value of a Integral from integral() 
Public IntegralDens02 As Double       'Value of a Integral from integral2() 
 
 
'The main subroutine that reads in variables and then computes values or calls other 
'subroutines to compute values and then displays them out to Output sheet. 
 
Sub Main() 
'clear cells for new output produced 
Worksheets("Output").Range("E5:AA1000").ClearContents 
Worksheets("DataOut").Range("c11:CA1000").ClearContents 
'Fix time and cost of warnings to two 
rW = 2 
cW = 2 
'For each of the alpha beta parameter combinations for the Weibull Random Variable 
For paracount = 0 To 17 
    beta = (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(70 + paracount, 1)) 
    alpha = (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(70 + paracount, 2)) 
    'For inspection time and costs 1 thru 4 
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    For ccr = 0 To 3 
        rI = 1 + ccr 
        cI = 1 + ccr 
         
            'For failure time and costs 2 thru 7 
            For ccc = 0 To 5 
                 
                cF = 2 + ccc 
                rF = 2 + ccc 
                'Read in values for program variables 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(2, 2) = alpha 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(3, 2) = beta 
                lambda = (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(4, 2)) 
                TTC = (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(6, 2)) 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(9, 2) = rI 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(10, 2) = rW 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(11, 2) = rF 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(12, 2) = cI 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(13, 2) = cW 
                Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(14, 2) = cF 
                InspTime = (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(16, 2)) 
                 
                'ONE   Run to Failure Maintenance Policy Calculate % up time and cost 
                'if there are no inspections or warnings only failures 
                noIW = 1 - (rF / (rF + (1 / lambda))) 
                'Calculate long run average cost of no inspection or warnings 
                cnoIW = cF / (rF + (1 / lambda)) 
                 
                 
                'Call integral subroutine 
                Call integral 
                 
                 
                'TWO   Calculate analytical % up time with warnings and failures only 
                pphigtone = Exp(-(alpha ^ beta))    'Probability phi is greater than one 
                Worksheets("Output").Cells(5, 2) = pphigtone 
                'Calculate the Median of the weibull random variable phi 
                Worksheets("Output").Cells(6, 2) = (1 / alpha) * (Log(2)) ^ (1 / beta) 
                ER = (rW * (1 - pphigtone)) + (rF * (pphigtone)) 'Expected repair time 
                 
                WnoI = 1 - (ER / (ER + ((1 / lambda) * (Worksheets("Output").Cells(2, 2))))) 
                cWnoI = cW * (1 - pphigtone) + cF * (pphigtone) 
                'Calculate the Long Run Average Cost of warning and failures 
                cWnoI2 = (cWnoI / (ER + (1 / lambda) * Worksheets("Output").Cells(2, 2))) 
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                'Loop thru the requested values of InspTime & apply to equations that are 
functions of InspTime 
                Dim count As Integer 
                count = TTC / InspTime 
                Worksheets("Output").Cells(4, 2) = count 
                 
                For j = 0 To count 
                    InspTime = (j + 1) * (Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(16, 2)) 
                    'Call integral2 subroutine 
                    Call integral2 
                     
                    'THREE 
                    'Calculate analytical % up time with Inspection only(a function of InspTime) 
                    Ionly = ((1 / lambda) * (1 - Exp(-lambda * InspTime)) / (InspTime + rI + rF 
* (1 - Exp(-lambda * InspTime)))) 
                    cIonly = cF + ((1 / lambda) / InspTime) * cI 
                    EcIonly = InspTime + rI + rF * (1 - Exp(-(lambda * InspTime))) 
                    cIonly2 = cI + cF * (1 - Exp(-lambda * InspTime)) 
                     
                    'FOUR 
                    'Calculate analytical % up time with both warning and inspections (a 
function of InspTime) 
                    Eu = 100 * Worksheets("Output").Cells(2, 2) 
                    Ec = (pphigtone * (rF + (rI + InspTime) * (1 / (1 - Exp(-lambda * 
InspTime))))) + ((1 - pphigtone) * rW) + (rI * IntegralDens02) + ((1 / lambda) * 
IntegralyDens01) 
                    Ed = (pphigtone * (rF + InspTime - ((1 / lambda) * (1 - Exp(-lambda * 
InspTime))) + rI * (1 / (1 - Exp(-lambda * InspTime))))) + ((1 - pphigtone) * rW) + (rI * 
IntegralDens02) 
                    numbInsp = Ec / InspTime 
                    cWandI = (cW * (1 - pphigtone) + cF * (pphigtone) + (cI * IntegralDens02) 
+ (cI * pphigtone / (1 - Exp(-lambda * InspTime)))) / Ec 
                     
                    'print to the Output sheet the percentage up times and costs for the different 
maintenance methods 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 5) = InspTime 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 12) = cF 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 6) = noIW 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 13) = cWnoI 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 7) = WnoI 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 8) = Ionly 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 14) = cIonly 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 9) = Eu / Ec 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 15) = cWandI 
 74 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 16) = IntegralDens02 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 17) = cIonly2 / EcIonly 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 18) = cWnoI2 
                    Worksheets("Output").Cells(5 + j, 19) = cnoIW 
                Next j 
            'Copy and paste values to set up a table of results 
            Worksheets("Inputs").Range("B19:D22").Copy 
            Worksheets("DataOuts").Cells((11 + 4 * paracount), (4 + (24 * ccr) + (3 * 
ccc))).PasteSpecial (xlPasteValues) 
            'Create a table of comparisons for different maintenance methods 
            Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(19, 5).Copy 
            Worksheets("Comparison").Cells((11 + paracount), (1 + 6 * ccr + 
ccc)).PasteSpecial (xlPasteValues) 
            Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(22, 5).Copy 
            Worksheets("Comparison").Cells((31 + paracount), (1 + 6 * ccr + 
ccc)).PasteSpecial (xlPasteValues) 
            Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(19, 6).Copy 
            Worksheets("Comparison").Cells((51 + paracount), (1 + 6 * ccr + 
ccc)).PasteSpecial (xlPasteValues) 
            Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(22, 6).Copy 
            Worksheets("Comparison").Cells((71 + paracount), (1 + 6 * ccr + 
ccc)).PasteSpecial (xlPasteValues) 
           
                     
             
        Next ccc 









'From Professor P.A. Jacobs (Naval Postgraduate School) 
'Uses gaussian quadrature with weights and t values from Abramowitz and Stegun 
'Handbook of Mathematical Functions to evaluate integral for a function listed 
 
iin = "gauss24" 
numb = 24 
'''''''''''''' 
alpha = Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(2, 2) 
beta = Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(3, 2) 
cweib = (alpha ^ beta) * beta 
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lowb = 0 
highb = 1 
mm = 0.5 * (highb - lowb) 
cc = 0.5 * (highb + lowb) 
sumden = 0 
sumnum = 0 
sumcheck = 0 
For i = 1 To numb 
T = Worksheets(iin).Cells(i + 1, 1) 
w = Worksheets(iin).Cells(i + 1, 2) 
y = cc + (mm * T) 
ffcheck = y 
ff1num = (y ^ beta) 
ff2num = Exp(-((alpha * y) ^ beta)) 
ffnum = ff1num * ff2num 
sumnum = sumnum + (ffnum * w) 
sumcheck = sumcheck + (ffcheck * w) 
Next i 
intnum = mm * sumnum 
intcheck = mm * sumcheck 
IntegralyDens01 = intnum * cweib 
term = Exp(-(alpha * 1) ^ beta) 
expected = (intnum * cweib) + term 
'Expected value (min weibull RV , 1) 
Worksheets("Output").Cells(2, 2) = expected 







'From Professor P.A. Jacobs (Naval Postgraduate School) 
'Uses gaussian quadrature with weights and t values from Abramowitz and Stegun 
'Handbook of Mathematical Functions to evaluate integral for a function listed 
iin = "gauss24" 
numb = 24 
'''''''''''''' 
'alpha = Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(2, 2) 
'beta = Worksheets("Inputs").Cells(3, 2) 
cweib = (alpha ^ beta) * beta 
lowb = 0 
highb = 1 
mm = 0.5 * (highb - lowb) 
cc = 0.5 * (highb + lowb) 
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sumden = 0 
sumnum = 0 
sumcheck = 0 
For i = 1 To numb 
T = Worksheets(iin).Cells(i + 1, 1) 
w = Worksheets(iin).Cells(i + 1, 2) 
y = cc + (mm * T) 
ffcheck = y 
ff1num = (y ^ (beta - 1)) 
ff2num = Exp(-((alpha * y) ^ beta)) 
ff3num = (Exp(-(lambda * InspTime) / y)) / (1 - Exp(-(lambda * InspTime) / y)) 
ffnum = ff1num * ff2num * ff3num 
sumnum = sumnum + (ffnum * w) 
sumcheck = sumcheck + (ffcheck * w) 
Next i 
intnum = mm * sumnum 
intcheck = mm * sumcheck 
Worksheets("Output").Cells(3, 2) = intnum * cweib 
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